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ADAPTIVE RESPONSES TO RISK AND THE IRRATIONALLY 
EMOTIONAL PUBLIC 
MOLLY J. WALKER WILSON* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Enlightenment concept of a reason–emotion duality is very much alive 
today, particularly in the multidisciplinary body of scholarship on risk policy, 
where much of the commentary laments the “distorting” influence of emotion 
on the public’s thinking about risk.1  Concerns that an emotionally volatile and 
largely ignorant public can hijack the legislative process pervade risk-policy 
scholarship, particularly among those writing in the increasingly influential 
area of behavioral decision theory.2  Yet, a small but growing number of 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  J.D., University of Virginia; 
Ph.D., University of Virginia.  Thanks to Joel Goldstein for the invitation to participate in this 
Childress Symposium, to john powell for inspiring this Article, and to all of the organizers and 
panelists who made the event so successful. 
 1. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 82 
(2005) (“Emotional reactions to risk, and probability neglect, also account for ‘alarmist bias.’”); 
see also RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 14 (2004) (advocating the 
use of cost-benefit analysis by regulators when shaping responses to catastrophic risk); Ruth F. 
Weiner, Comment on Sheila Jasanoff’s Guest Editorial in Risk Analysis, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 495, 
495–96 (1993); Doni Gewirtzman, Our Founding Feelings: Emotion, Commitment, and 
Imagination in Constitutional Culture, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 623, 626 (2009) (discussing the 
drafters of the United States Constitution as subscribing to a theory based in part on the “widely 
accepted propositions that still enjoy widespread acceptance in contemporary constitutional 
culture,” namely, the reason and emotion duality, which were seen as diametrically opposed). 
 2. One of the more well-known papers arguing that social exchange distorts public risk 
response is Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 89 (“When emotions lead people 
to probability neglect, the alarm shown by others is highly likely to be playing a role.  When 
citizens fixate on a worst-case scenario, social processes are probably ensuring that they do so.”); 
James Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)reasonable Care, 94 VA. L. REV. 1641, 1670 (2008) 
(discussing how social exchange of information can lead to risk aversion in a medical setting); 
Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order 
Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 105 (2009) (“If the behavioralists were in 
charge, they would insist that legal doctrine and judging should account for these predictable 
failures of rationality and that, without accounting for such failures, no interpretation of text or 
pursuit of efficiency could possibly yield rational, much less optimal, results.”); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 103–04 (2002) 
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commentators from anthropology, psychology, sociology, law, and related 
disciplines argue that some nonrational features of choice formation that were 
traditionally viewed as problematic may be indispensable to optimal decision-
making.3  In this Article, I focus on contributions from social science that 
suggest the need for a fresh look at the role of emotion and its cultural 
influences on private and public decisions about potential sources of harm.  I 
argue that affect-based responses to risk are properly viewed as expressions of 
individual values, world views, and personal preferences and, as such, achieve 
legitimacy as a basis for risk policy.  In advancing this argument, I align my 
perspective with that of Dan Kahan4 and others who advance an optimistic 
view of the role of emotion in public risk response.5 
I.  TRADITIONAL RISK ANALYSIS AND BEHAVIORAL DECISION THEORY 
Risk dominates our modern social, cultural, and legal landscape.  Ulrich 
Beck, the German sociologist, has argued that over the past century, we have 
moved from a culture of scarcity to a culture of risk.6  Beck’s characterization 
is echoed by the American political scientist Aaron Wildavsky who famously 
remarked, “How extraordinary!  The richest, longest-lived, best-protected, 
most resourceful civilization, with the highest degree of insight into its own 
technology, is on its way to becoming the most frightened.”7  One obvious 
source of fear is the media, who, along with public figures and private citizens, 
take advantage of the burgeoning of new channels of communication that carry 
information about risks into households and workplaces all over America.8  
Another reason for the twenty-first century shift in attention to risks is the 
changing nature of the dangers we face.  Many risk researchers have 
emphasized the novelty of today’s harms, the unseen potential effects on 
individual health, collective well-being, and the potential for irreversible 
 
(advocating that government should work to reduce quasi-rational but real fears due to the 
economic costs caused by such fears). 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. For a full discussion of Kahan’s claim, see Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion 
in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 741 (2008). 
 5. Emotion researchers and others writing in the areas of behavior and brain science have 
occasionally offered different definitions for “emotion” and “affect.”  I use the terms 
interchangeably throughout this article, but acknowledge that to do so is not without controversy.  
See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, Response, Emotions, Values, and the Construction of Risk, 156 U. PA. 
L. REV. PENNUMBRA 421, 424 n.13 (2008), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/ 
03-2008/Bandes.pdf (“The terms ‘emotion’ and ‘affect’ are sometimes used interchangeably and 
sometimes to connote different concepts.  Neither has a single accepted meaning.”). 
 6. See ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 19 (1992). 
 7. Aaron Wildavsky, No Risk Is the Highest Risk of All, 67 AM. SCIENTIST 32, 32 (1979). 
 8. David L. Altheide, The News Media, the Problem Frame, and the Production of Fear, 38 
SOC. Q. 647, 664 (1997). 
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damage to the planet.9  As renowned risk researcher Paul Slovic has pointed 
out: 
In recent decades, the profound development of chemical and nuclear 
technologies has been accompanied by the potential to cause catastrophic and 
long-lasting damage to the earth and the life forms that inhabit it.  The 
mechanisms underlying these complex technologies are unfamiliar and 
incomprehensible to most citizens.  Their most harmful consequences are rare 
and often delayed, hence difficult to assess by statistical analysis and not well 
suited to management by trial-and-error learning.10 
As the salience of hazards reaches the saturation point, a variety of schools 
of thought offer opposing perspectives on how we ought to craft responses to 
potential sources of harm.  The foundation of the current discussion is criticism 
of the neoclassical economic notion that human beings apply reason (in the 
traditional sense of the word) to arrive at certain, fixed truths.11  The 
Enlightenment idea that we can observe our complex world and, acting 
rationally, arrive at universal truths about what will harm or kill us, has been 
seriously undermined by empirical findings from modern behavioral science.12  
The established fact that human beings are influenced by nonrational 
considerations has led some to argue that members of the public should be 
largely excluded from participating in risk-policy decisions.13 
Although most of the relevant empirical studies on human decision-making 
have been conducted within the past forty years, conclusions drawn from this 
body of scholarship have largely reinforced prior existing notions about the 
proper role of the polity in direct policy formation.14  Large-scale risk 
decisions historically have not been trusted to the masses.  As a rule, 
conventional risk analysis was—and still is—conducted by investigators 
 
 9. Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, Apr. 17, 1987, SCIENCE at 280, 280 (1987) [hereinafter 
Slovic, Perception of Risk]. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Olivier Jean Blanchard, Neoclassical Synthesis, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, 634–36 (1987). 
 12. See Slovic, Perception of Risk, supra note 9, at 281. 
 13. Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk Assessment 
Battlefield, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59, 59 (1997).  “[Public risk judgments] are seen as irrational 
by many harsh critics of public perceptions.  These critics draw a sharp dichotomy between the 
experts and the public.  Experts are seen as purveying risk assessments, characterized as 
objective, analytic, wise, and rational—based on the real risks.  In contrast, the public is seen to 
rely on perceptions of risk that are subjective, often hypothetical, emotional, foolish, and 
irrational.”  Id. at 60. 
 14. This assertion obviously implicates the role of participatory democracy in this country, 
an issue with complex and fascinating historical and political connotations, the consideration of 
which are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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working in the so-called “hard sciences.”15  Decisions about how to regulate 
potential sources of harm and how to allocate resources are often based upon 
cost–benefit analyses that are data-driven and purportedly rational.16  In many 
circumstances, statistic-based information that serves as the basis for risk 
responses is treated as “fact.”17  But allocation of national resources, decisions 
that prioritize certain dangers, and efforts to regulate citizens’ behaviors based 
upon statistical data may not comport with the preferences and priorities of all, 
or even a majority of the public. 
With respect to conventional risk analysis, there are two problems for 
regulators and lawmakers.  The first is a political, or at least a management, 
problem: traditional risk analysis ignores or significantly underemphasizes 
public response to various harms.18  This feature of risk analysis means that 
policymakers are, first, unable to predict how members of society will view 
specific dangers as the threats become salient to the public and, second, are ill 
equipped to craft responses to risk that take into account public fear of these 
hazards.19  The second problem with conventional risk analysis is normative: 
namely, that any formula that leaves public sentiment out of the equation (or 
purports to or attempts to) may be based upon questionable assumptions about 
the appropriate basis for action or inaction.  As Beck points out, as long as the 
debate is “conducted exclusively or dominantly in the terms and formulas of 
natural science” the danger exists that the “terms will inadvertently include 
human beings in the picture only as organic material . . . it runs the risk of 
atrophying into a discussion of nature without people, without asking about 
matters of social and cultural significance.”20 
Although traditional risk analysis has been profoundly influential, recent 
interdisciplinary scholarship has detailed the myriad conscious and 
nonconscious influences shaping risk preferences and policies.  One example 
of a deliberate, philosophical approach is the precautionary principle, which 
specifies that when science is uncertain—particularly in the case of hazards 
 
 15. See MARY DOUGLAS, RISK AND BLAME: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL THEORY 49 (1992) 
(discussing the ubiquitous nature of science, and its promise to provide answers, as experiencing 
a heyday in the 1950s). 
 16. See Roger E. Kasperson et al., The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual 
Framework, 8 RISK ANALYSIS 177, 179 (1988) [hereinafter Kasperson et al., Social 
Amplification]; Slovic, Perception of Risk, supra note 9, at 281. 
 17. And yet, “Assessment procedures derived from the public health, toxicity, and 
engineering studies that have dominated the management programs of governments and 
corporations illuminate one portion of the risk complex while concealing others.”  Roger E. 
Kasperson & Jeanne X. Kasperson, The Social Amplification and Attenuation of Risk, 545 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 95, 96 (1996). 
 18. See Kasperson et al., Social Amplification, supra note 16, at 177. 
 19. Slovic, Perception of Risk, supra note 9, at 285 (arguing for the importance of the 
public’s role in risk assessment). 
 20. See BECK, supra note 6, at 24. 
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that may cause irreversible or catastrophic consequences—policies should 
favor caution.21  Widespread adoption of the precautionary principle has 
generated a considerable amount of debate.22  Nonconscious processes, 
including mental shortcuts and biases that bear on individual and collective 
judgment, have also received a great deal of attention in the risk-policy 
literature.  In particular, the interdisciplinary psychology and law, sociology, 
anthropology, and political science fields have engaged related questions.23 
One body of scholarship emphasizing cognitive research challenges 
neoclassical economic theory regarding human judgment and decision-making.  
Some fifty years ago, two now-famous articles, The Problem of Social Cost by 
Ronald Coase24 and Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts 
by Guido Calabresi25 marked the birth of law and economics along with 
rational choice theory and its view that humans are rational actors who apply 
logic to arrive at utility-maximizing decisions.  The rational actor model came 
under fire from critics who asserted that the model was poorly suited to 
describing real-life human behavior.  For example, the ground-breaking work 
of Kahneman and Tversky, leading to the advent of prospect theory,26 paved 
the way for subsequent research in behavioral decision theory on how people 
 
 21. The principle has been represented a variety of ways and in multiple contexts.  One 
example is the precautionary principle, which has been characterized in the following way: 
When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary 
measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully 
established scientifically.  In this context the proponent of an activity, rather than the 
public, should bear the burden of proof.  The process of applying the precautionary 
principle must be open, informed and democratic and must include potentially affected 
parties.  It must also involve an examination of the full range of alternatives, including no 
action. 
Science and Environmental Health Network, Wingspread Conference on the Precautionary 
Principle (Jan. 26, 1998), available at http://www.sehn.org/precaution.html. 
 22. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 
1003, 1003 (2003) (detailing the disadvantages associated with the stringent adoption of 
precautionary approaches); see also Lesley Wexler, Limiting the Precautionary Principle: 
Weapons Regulation in the Face of Scientific Uncertainty, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 459, 475–77 
(2006) (advising caution on the application of the precautionary principle when it comes to 
military grade pollutants). 
 23. See Slovic, Perception of Risk, supra note 9, at 281. 
 24. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 42–44 
(1960) (proposing that in the absence of transaction costs, initial allocation of entitlements will be 
irrelevant, because parties will bargain to reach the most efficient result). 
 25. See generally Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of 
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) (arguing for economically efficient allocation of tort liability). 
 26. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 274 (1979); see generally Amos Tversky & Daniel 
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3–20 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky 
eds., 1982). 
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actually—as opposed to theoretically—make decisions.27  The upshot of this 
collective work is that humans simply do not have the cognitive capacity to 
reason according to principles of logic, they have imperfect memories, they 
rely on cognitive shortcuts, and they are subject to a variety of biases that make 
much of human decision-making nonrational.  One group of scholars writing in 
the behavioral decision theory arena28 emphasizes a need to counteract or 
combat faulty decision-making arising from irrational human decision-
making.29 
Emotion cues have been described as interfering with optimal decisions 
because they can lead to choices other than those suggested by formal rules of 
logic.  Affect can influence a variety of decision paradigms, but it plays a 
particularly important role in decisions about risks.  Empirical research has 
revealed a strong affective component to risk judgments.30  Traditional risk 
analysis, which purports to be based on fact, denies a legitimate role for 
affect.31  Likewise, many behavioral decision theorists view emotion as a 
 
 27. A very small subset of the articles relating to Kahneman and Tversky’s work include 
Shawn J. Bayern, Rational Ignorance, Rational Closed-Mindedness, and Modern Economic 
Formalisim in Contract Law, 97 CAL. L. REV. 943 (2009); Chris Guthrie, Prospect Theory, Risk 
Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115 (2003); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias 
and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608 (1998); Douglas A. Kysar, The 
Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700 (2003); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The 
Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165 (2003); Alan Schwartz, 
How Much Irrationality Does the Market Permit?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2008); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Moral Heuristics and Moral Framing, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1556 (2004).  For a review of 
recent books influenced by prospect theory and related theories of human cognition, see On Amir 
& Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs Law and Policy, 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098 (2008) (discussing the books, RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) 
and DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR 
DECISIONS (2008)). 
 28. The term “behavioral decision theory” or “behavioral decision theorist” is used in this 
article to represent the loose group of scholars who rely heavily upon the seminal work of 
Kahneman and Tversky’s work to analyze human decision-making and behavior as it pertains to 
legal and governmental institutions and policies.  A great number of scholars in this area focus on 
the limitations of human cognition, and particularly the heuristics and biases that can result in 
nonrational judgments. 
 29. See, e.g., Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 252 (1998); 
see also Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1243–44, 1255 (2003); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The 
Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1177–1206 (2003) 
(providing some examples of arguments along these lines). 
 30. Paul Slovic, Affect, Reason, and Mere Hunches, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 191, 195 (2007) 
[hereinafter Slovic, Hunches]. 
 31. See Kasperson et al., supra note 16, at 177 (stating that traditional risk analysis focuses 
primarily on the probability and magnitude of risk). 
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source of bias with the potential to distort judgment in a variety of ways.32  
Legal scholarship cites the potential for fear or outrage to cause people to 
overestimate the risk posed by certain crimes, nuclear energy, terrorism, 
pesticides, Communism . . . the list goes on.33  Because the public at large does 
not have ready access to scientific data and lacks sophistication regarding 
statistics and issues of proof, members of society are deemed vulnerable to 
emotional appeals—particularly those based upon fear.  Traditional risk 
analysis excludes the public primarily because the public is uninformed.  
Behavioral decision theorists would exclude the public because the public is 
impassioned.  Both counsel that risk regulation be assigned to politically 
insulated experts whose judgments are supposedly free of emotion’s distorting 
impact.34 
Unequivocally, certain cognitive patterns interfere with optimal decision-
making under some circumstances.  It is not clear, however, that emotions 
create sufficiently serious problems for judgment formation so as to justify 
insulating the public from risk decisions.  Interdisciplinary efforts over the past 
thirty years have yielded a rich and nuanced picture of public risk perception.35  
Not only does emotion accompany risk judgments, it increasingly appears to 
assist the decision-maker in forming those judgments.  Slovic notes that 
“[w]hile we may be able to ‘do the right thing’ without analysis (e.g., dodge a 
falling object), it is unlikely that we can employ analytic thinking rationally 
without guidance from affect somewhere along the line.  Affect is essential to 
rational action.”36 
 
 32. Slovic, supra note 13, at 59. 
 33. See, e.g., Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 689; Cass Sunstein, Irreversible and 
Catastrophic: Global Warming, Terrorism, and Other Problems, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 3, 7 
(2005–2006).  Supporting the notion that emotions can cause irrational decision-making is the 
dual system concept of reasoning.  System 1 reasoning is “fast, automatic, effortless, associative, 
and often emotionally charged.”  Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology 
for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1451 (2003).  On the other hand, System 2 
reasoning is slow and deliberate, and it is more likely to include consideration of probabilities and 
careful weighing of costs and benefits.  Id.  The implication of this view is that System 1 is 
necessary in situations where there is a lack of information and resources but that it is more likely 
to result in error than System 2.  Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 747–48 (2008). 
 34. For examples of works that propose substituting public risk decisions with those of 
unbiased experts, see Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 737, and Cass R. Sunstein, LAWS OF 
FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 126 (2005). 
 35. A number of commentators have pointed out that emotions are more than hurdles to 
overcome in applying rational reasoning.  See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 5, at 422 (“Although 
emotions are often portrayed as bursts of feeling that intrude upon rational thought from time to 
time, this view is out of step with current findings across a range of disciplines.”). 
 36. Slovic, Hunches, supra note 30, at 194. 
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II.  OTHER APPROACHES TO RISK PERCEPTION 
In addition to Traditional Risk Analysis and Behavioral Decision Theory, 
there are several other important sources of scholarship in the risk perception 
area.  The first is the Psychometric Study of Risk Perception, which can be 
characterized as an attempt to derive a “cognitive map” of risk perceptions.37  
This approach relies upon survey data to determine attitudes about a wide 
variety of risks with the goal of understanding the characteristics of a risk most 
likely to cause human beings concern.38  The Social Amplification of Risk 
(SAR) Theory builds and expands upon the psychometric paradigm by 
including a dynamic model describing how information about risk is amplified 
or attenuated as it travels via channels of social discourse.39  This model 
includes consideration of cultural and symbolic understandings of risk along 
with the potential for risk events to serve as signals portending future harms.40  
As the foundational article in this area points out: “[R]isk has meaning only to 
the extent that it treats how people think about the world and its relationships.  
Thus, there is no such thing as ‘true’ (absolute) and ‘distorted’ (socially 
determined) risk.”41  SAR is particularly useful in the discussion of emotional 
reactions to risks because it identifies the underlying source of many affective 
reactions: culture. 
Empirical and theoretical scholarship in the areas of psychology, 
sociology, and anthropology has long viewed emotional responses as rooted in 
cultural understandings.  It has been remarked: “Feelings are not substances to 
be discovered in our blood but social practices organized by stories that we 
both enact and tell.”42  Increasingly, the link between culture and emotions is 
being recognized by writers outside of the social sciences, particularly those in 
the legal academy.43  Specifically, while basic emotions such as fear, disgust, 
surprise, and joy are universally experienced to some degree, the more 
complex nuances of emotional reactions vary depending upon associated 
 
 37. PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 222 (2000). 
 38. See Baruch Fischoff et al., How Safe is Safe Enough? A Psychometric Study of Attitudes 
Towards Technological Risks and Benefits, 9 POL’Y SCI. 127, 130 (1978). 
 39. See Kasperson et al., Social Amplification, supra note 16, at 182. 
 40. Id. at 178–79. 
 41. Id. at 181. 
 42. Michelle Z. Rosaldo, Toward an Anthropology of Self and Feeling, in CULTURE 
THEORY:  ESSAYS ON MIND, SELF, AND EMOTION 137, 143 (Richard A. Shweder & Robert A. 
LeVine eds., 1984). 
 43. See, e.g., Gewirtzman, supra note 1, at 630 (“‘[C]onstitutional culture’ often transcends 
the legalistic and the logical, with emotion functioning as an essential predicate for the American 
constitutional regime and a vehicle for collective expression of social aspirations.” (internal 
citation omitted)). 
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cultural meanings.44  Scholars have stated to explore the ways in which 
emotions are “scripted” by culture.45  Our traditional understanding of 
emotions as rooted in biology have more recently been supplemented by a 
complimentary interpretation of social norms and socially-derived reactions to 
various situations.46  Evocative triggers make little sense when interpreted in a 
vacuum, absent from cultural interpretation and variability.47  In the context of 
risk perception, providing emotions and the relevant culture-based norms have 
received special attention.48  It has been noted, for example, that triggers for 
public “panics” vary from one country to another, evidence that fear about 
harms is largely influenced by societal expectations and understandings.49 
Although psychometric risk analysis explicitly uses emotion (dread) as one 
measure of concern for harms, and the Social Amplification of Risk theory 
includes consideration of cultural inputs, neither directly address the question 
of what value, if any, emotions and culture have in the risk policy debate.  For 
a normative perspective on the proper role of culture and emotion in risk 
perception, we must look elsewhere.  One potential source of insight is cultural 
anthropologist Mary Douglas, who was an early advocate of the cultural theory 
of risk perception.  Douglas argued, first, that cultural understandings have a 
profound impact on public perceptions of risk, and, second, that attitudes about 
risk based upon cultural norms are legitimate—or at least inevitable—bases for 
risk response.50  Douglas asserts that by failing to recognize cultural 
 
 44. See Klaus R. Scherer, Evidence for Both Universality and Cultural Specificity of 
Emotion Elicitation, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 172, 175 (Paul 
Ekman & Richard J. Davidson eds., 1994) for the notion that cultural understandings and norms 
underpin most emotional responses. 
 45. See Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. 
REV. 851, 864–65 (2009) (“[Emotional common sense] is shaped and bounded by culture, which 
imposes on our emotions ‘a recognizable, meaningful order, so that we may not only feel but 
know what we feel and act accordingly.’”) (quoting CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF 
CULTURES 80 (1973)). 
 46. ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, THE FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS:  BODY AND EMOTION IN THE 
MAKING OF CONSCIOUSNESS 51 (1999). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Paul Slovic has said: 
 I believe that the multidimensional, subjective, value-laden, frame-sensitive nature of 
risky decisions, as described above, supports a very different view, which Dean and 
Thompson call ‘the contextualist conception.’  This conception places probabilities and 
consequences on the list of relevant risk attributes along with voluntariness, equity, and 
other important contextual parameters. 
Slovic, supra note 13, at 67. 
 49. Other aspects of the risk context, such as how a risk is framed is similarly important to 
human understanding and to the production of fear or dread.  A detailed discussion of rhetorical 
and other influences on risk perception is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 50. See DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 5–7 (explaining that communities define danger and 
assess blame in order to protect the common good); see also MARY DOUGLAS & AARON 
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antecedents of risk perception, risk policy makers inevitably impose their own 
cultural biases on those for whom they make risk decisions.51  Douglas 
suggests that purportedly value-neutral scientists and policy analysts have been 
doing this for years.52  The troublesome aspect of how decisions are made is 
not the lack of neutrality—as predilections and biases are inevitable 
characteristics of human judgment—but rather, the assertion that decisions are 
value-neutral.  The claim of neutrality risks inappropriately or prematurely 
subjugating the will of members of the public to that of scientists and policy 
experts.  Importantly, as Douglas writes, “[the risk researcher’s] method 
assumes that all humans have the same responses and preferences that are 
enshrined in the utilitarian philosophy.  Instead of objectivity, we find 
ideological entrenchment.”53 
Douglas was among the first to emphasize the inevitability of the role of 
emotion in decisions about sources of harm, stating, “Anger, hope, and fear are 
part of most risky situations.”54  Subsequent researched has provided ample 
evidence to support Douglas’s view of emotion as integral to risk perception.  
Slovic and his colleagues have found that judgments about threats posed by 
various harms were correlated with emotional valence, as measured by rating 
the activity on bipolar scales such as good/bad, nice/awful, dread/not dread, 
and so forth.55  This finding suggests that people base their judgments of an 
activity or a technology not only on what they think about it but also on how 
they feel about it.  Of course, the emotions that people report when assessing 
dangers may simply be a byproduct of rational, analytic decisions about risk.56  
This possibility was tested using a variety of research paradigms involving 
manipulating affect and holding analytic information constant.  Although cause 
and effect is difficult to definitively demonstrate, empirical findings from this 
line of work suggest that the primary catalyst for judgments is emotional 
reactions, rather than effortful reasoning processes, and that reasoning 
supplements or justifies judgments that are formed largely based upon 
 
WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE: AN ARTICLE ON THE SELECTION OF TECHNICAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS 6–7 (1982) (“[D]ifferent social principles that guide behavior affect 
the judgment of what dangers should be most feared, what risks are worth taking, and who should 
be allowed to take them.”). 
 51. DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 11. 
 52. Id. 
 53. DOUGLAS, supra note 15, at 13.  As Douglas writes, “When he brackets off culture from 
his work, the well-intentioned risk analyst has tied his own hands.  He wants to be free of bias, he 
would rather pretend that bias is not important than sully himself by trying to categorize kinds of 
bias.”  Id. 
 54. Id. at 12. 
 55. Early psychometric studies of risk perception showed that feelings of dread were the 
major determinant of public perception and acceptance of risk for a wide range of hazards.  
Fischhoff et al., supra note 38, at 149; Slovic, Perception of Risk, supra note 9, at 284–85. 
 56. Kahan, supra note 33, at 746. 
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emotional reactions.57  Findings from psychological studies on choice 
formation suggest that decision makers often optimize outcomes when they 
stick with initial “gut” judgments.58  Analyzing costs and benefits of various 
courses of action, for example, often leads to a decision that people later regret 
and one which is inconsistent with later behavior and preferences.59 
The notion that affective reactions play a valuable role in decision-making 
(even when deliberate reasoning is feasible) is consistent with the “cultural 
evaluator” model advanced by Dan Kahan.  The cultural evaluator model of 
risk perception hypothesizes that emotional responses to risk reflect culturally 
defined, expressive appraisals of potential sources of harm.60  Kahan writes, 
“When people draw on their emotions to judge the risk that such an activity 
poses, they form an expressively rational attitude about what it would mean for 
their cultural worldviews for society to credit the claim that that activity is 
dangerous and worthy of regulation . . . .”61  The cultural evaluator model 
differs from both the neoclassical economic rational actor model (which would 
deny that emotion plays any real role in risk decisions) and the behavioral-
decision-theory emotion-as-bias model, by favoring an active, utilitarian role 
for emotion.  Because emotion serves as a signal of underlying values,62 
emotional responses to risk can be understood as tools, guiding the individual 
toward decisions that serve deeply held values and preferences, rather than 
treating emotion as a source of bias.  It is not, after all, irrational for members 
of society to care about meanings and not just about consequences and to form 
positions on risk that express their cultural values.63  As Kahan points out, 
“individuals’ decisions to forgo or forbear risks is based not on the expected 
utility of those actions but on their social meanings, which are unlikely to be 
tied in any systematic way to the actuarial magnitude of those risks.”64  For an 
individual assessing a risk, the maintenance of her worldview may well be 
more important than making a decision that is supported by expert opinion, 
particularly when to deviate from her own accepted worldview would lead to 
cognitive dissonance and might threaten her self identity. 
As should be clear, the cultural view is at odds with the notion that 
“irrational” risk behavior is any choice that is not statistically supported.  This 
principle has particular implications for the behavioral decision theory 
 
 57. Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 J. 
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 13–14 (2000). 
 58. See TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE 
UNCONSCIOUS 170 (2002). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Kahan, supra note 33, at 750. 
 61. Id. at 750–51. 
 62. Id. at 758. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 754. 
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literature, where emotional reactions to potential sources of harm are often 
discussed in the context of “probability neglect.”  Probability neglect occurs 
when individuals make choices that are deemed nonrational because the 
choices do not reflect those choices that would be predicted by the probability 
of a particular outcome.65  Probability neglect is discussed in the context of 
emotion because experiments often reveal that triggering strong emotions in 
people leads them to fear a potential source of danger “more than they should” 
given the probability that the danger will actually materialize.66  The problem 
with this understanding of choice as fundamentally irrational is that it treats 
statistical outcomes as the only reasonable basis upon which to form choices. 
An example is illustrative: suppose Sheila is particularly interested in 
avoiding sudden, accidental death, such as death by automobile.  She values 
protection against such demise above protection from a death by complications 
related to obesity-related diseases.  Sheila invests substantial sums of money in 
safety features for her automobile, and as she grows older, avoids driving in 
poor weather or after dark.  She simultaneously neglects to invest in weight 
loss and exercise, instead suffering the risks associated with Type 2 diabetes.  
Rhonda, on the other hand, has a preference pattern that is directly opposed to 
that of Sheila’s.  Rhonda’s self concept is consistent with the “no guts, no 
glory.”  Rhonda is terrified of dying from a slowly progressing, debilitating 
disease; she is a “fitness fanatic” who invests in fast cars and rides a 
motorcycle.  The cultural evaluator model denigrates neither Sheila’s nor 
Rhonda’s value and emotion-based preferences.  Instead, they are accepted as 
personal bases for risk decisions. 
Of course, risk decisions vary tremendously.  Some risk decisions only 
affect certain subpopulations (or affect these groups disproportionately), while 
other risk decisions influence most or all of the population.  Risk preferences 
may be different, depending upon who is affected by the decision (“self” or 
“others”).  Respondents’ attitudes also differ, and the response to a particular 
question depends on whether the person perceives that the risk is to him- or 
herself, on the one hand, or to members of an out-group, on the other.  The 
rationale expressed in the example of Sheila and Rhonda applies more broadly 
to risks we perceive to populations to which we do not ourselves belong.  Even 
in arms-length situations where we might expect a more “rational” analytical 
approach, preferences are important.  For example, Bill chooses to donate 
money to the Diabetes Foundation over other causes.  He would continue to do 
so even if he discovered that each dollar given to alternative Charity X results 
 
 65. See generally Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric 
Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 185 (2001) (demonstrating the 
important role of affect in preferences for various lottery outcomes). 
 66. A commonly cited example can be found in JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND 
DECIDING 246–47 (2001). 
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in a higher percentage of lives saved.  Bill may be motivated by the fact that he 
has a beloved Aunt who is diabetic.  Alternatively, Bill may view his continued 
support of the Diabetes Foundation as loyalty to a cause (a value upon which 
he places importance) and the fulfillment of an on-going commitment he has 
made.67 
There is a deeply personal value judgment inherent in many risk decisions.  
To the extent that it makes sense to say that we prefer a particular mode of 
injury or demise, we need to consider the possibility that the risks that are 
over-feared are more emotionally charged because we are particularly 
interested in avoiding death or injury by those means.  The claim that human 
beings should fear all threats with the same probability of injury or death to the 
same extent is itself a value judgment.  Moreover, decisions made that take 
into account emotional states are more consonant with the human experience.  
A “rational” choice may be supported by conventional statistics, but it may 
also fail to maximize the decision maker’s well-being, and it may thus actually 
be nonrational in a very real sense.68  In any risky choice, the individual’s 
experience of hope and fear is part of the benefit or the harm.69  It has been 
remarked, “If individuals’ factual beliefs are expressive of cultural worldviews, 
then experts who treat those beliefs as ‘blunders’ unentitled to normative 
respect in a ‘deliberative democracy’ are necessarily shielding regulatory law 
from citizens’ visions of the good society.”70 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has suggested that there are serious theoretical and practical 
problems with supplanting individual risk choices with those of experts, who 
are themselves not value-neutral.  Some risky choices, such as whether to buy 
insurance, drive a car, smoke, eat healthful foods, receive regular medical 
 
 67. As Robert Zajonc has pointed out, unlike other influences on action, “preferences [and 
emotions] cannot be judged for accuracy or validity.”  Robert B. Zajonc, Emotions, in 1 THE 
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 591, 597 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998). 
 68. See Rottenstreich & Hsee, supra note 65, at 190. 
 69. Id.  (“[H]ope and fear may be crucial consequences in and of themselves.  These feelings 
are modeled by the S-shaped weighting function.  Thus, although an S-shaped weighting function 
surely leads to preferences that are incoherent, it may fully capture the decision maker’s actual 
experience.  In contrast, although expected utility’s identity weighting function leads to coherent 
preferences, it may neglect crucial (affective) aspects of a decision maker’s experience.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 70. Kahan, supra note 33, at 761 (emphasis omitted) (internal citation omitted).  Dan Kahan 
and Paul Slovic (who was integral to developing the psychometric and social amplification 
models) take the position that “cultural worldviews pervade popular (not to mention expert) risk 
assessments and that a genuine commitment to democracy forbids simply dismissing such 
perceptions as products of ‘bounded rationality.’”  Dan M. Kahan & Paul Slovic, Cultural 
Evaluations of Risk: “Values” or “Blunders”?, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 166, 166 (2006). 
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check-ups, and practice safe sex, reside with the individual.  But many others 
are dictated or influenced by public policy decisions made by a select few, on 
behalf of the public.71  In theory, in a representative democracy, members of 
society play an important role in shaping policy by exerting pressure on elected 
officials.  Yet sometimes a philosophy of paternalism becomes so prevalent 
among policymakers that it becomes difficult for voters to identify and target 
those lawmakers most likely to substitute their own risk preferences for those 
of the individual citizen.  In other instances, a majority of the electorate may 
not object to certain restrictions on freedoms that simply render choices this 
majority would already make inevitable.  However, the acquiescence of some 
citizens may adversely influence a sizable minority.  Some situations justify 
imposing restrictions on public risk decisions.  Policies that are designed to 
prevent gross inefficiencies, excessive public costs, or prevent the 
victimization of certain powerless groups—such as in situations where there 
are power imbalances, strategic actors, or free riding—may well be appropriate 
and necessary.  Nevertheless, lawmakers should be clear about when a policy 
serves a specific, broader goal as compared to when it simply serves to save an 
actor from his or her own “irrational” decision. 
Traditional risk analysis has, through recent years, been more open to input 
from the public.  But some behavioral law researchers have resisted this trend, 
suggesting that even when fully informed, the public’s passions will cloud 
judgment and result in poor decision-making.  An understanding of emotion as 
an expression of underlying values provides a new framework for 
understanding public perception of risk.  This understanding argues against 
leaving decisions in the hands of so-called experts, who are themselves 
inevitably influenced by their own cultural worldviews, which may or may not 
correspond with those of individual members of society. 
The view I advocate argues in favor of soliciting more public feedback 
about various risks, and suggests that when the government severely restricts 
public involvement in risk decisions, it should do so only under limited 
circumstances and in the face of clear and widespread misunderstanding, 
misinformation, or distortion.72 
Feedback from the public may be accumulated through a variety of 
mechanisms, including public hearings, citizen advisory committees, surveys, 
 
 71. A brief list of examples include wearing seatbelts, investing in the military, supporting 
fire and rescue personnel through taxes, paying a 911 surcharge on phone service, vaccinating 
children, evacuating residential areas in times of natural disaster, and maintaining speed limits.  
Like many risks, some of these precautionary measures may be designed to protect the public at 
large.  However, some risky choices that people are free to make if they choose have negative 
effects for the public if certain harms surface. 
 72. Importantly, the conveyance of information about a risk can trigger incorrect responses 
when the framing of the issue is misleading.  For this reason, deliberate communication about risk 
should be framed in a way that expresses a plurality of social meanings. 
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focus groups, and interactive technologies.  Each of these methods has benefits 
and drawbacks.  A recent example was the town hall meetings discussing 
health care reform over the summer of 2009, when the Obama Administration 
was attempting to garner support for health care reform.73  One view maintains 
that these meetings served primarily as forums for small, well-organized, and 
politically motivated groups to dominate and distort the discussion.74  
Regardless of whether this characterization is accurate, the town hall meetings 
demonstrate the potential for public forums to serve as opportunities for 
grandstanding.  Employing a variety of methods of garnering public input can 
avoid the distorting influence of a small, but vocal minority.  Municipalities 
and state policy-makers have already used the multimethod approach in cases 
where a proposed plan will affect a large group of citizens for many years to 
come.  In the 1980s, for example, when New Jersey was revising its water 
quality regulations, the state used various of methods for soliciting public 
input, including a task force, informal focus groups, surveys, and public 
hearings.75 
When it comes to risk perception, the Enlightenment notion that every 
person is capable of arriving at universal truths through empirical observation 
has been debunked.  Evidence supports the notion that when human beings 
choose to confront or avoid risks, they are guided by culturally-based, 
emotion-driven preferences.  In many cases, our actions are not supported by 
statistics derived from research in the hard sciences.  This discrepancy exists 
because we do not, as a rule, apply rules of logic and reason probabilistically.  
Nevertheless, our emotion-based reactions have value in the risk decision 
context.  Selectively eschewing risks that are particularly threatening to our 
own individual sense of identity or security increases our well-being in 
substantial and important ways.  It would be a mistake, therefore, to adopt a 
policy that favors supplanting individual choice or collective preference with 
expert opinion.  Vital interests in privacy and autonomy mandate that we have 
an active role in decisions regarding the dangers around us so that we may face 
the perils of our own choosing and avoid those that cause us special terror.  
 
 73. See, e.g., Town Hall Meeting on Health Care Turns Ugly, CNN.COM, Aug. 18, 2009, 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08/07/health.care.scuffles/index.html 
 74. Jake Tapper, Democratic National Committee Suggests Town Hall Protestors are Fringe 
Birther Mob, ABCNEWS.COM, Aug. 15, 2009, http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/08/ 
democratic-national-committee-suggest-town-hall-protestors-are-fringe-birther-mob-.html (“The 
White House suggestion that some of the anger seen at town hall meetings is ‘manufactured’ 
apparently wasn’t seen as strong enough, so the Democratic National Committee in a new web 
video is depicting the protestors as irrational birthers who want to ‘destroy’ President Obama.”) 
 75. COMM’N ON BEHAVIORAL & SOCIAL SCIENCES & EDUCATION (CBSSE), 
UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 205 Paul C. Stern & 
Harvey V. Fineberg, eds., (1996). 
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These are decisions that are profoundly influenced by our identities as social, 
emotional, and cultural beings. 
